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  INTRODUCTION   
A majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
seems to have decided, over the past decade, that the law of personal 
jurisdiction needs to be cleaned up. In cases addressing both general 
and specific personal jurisdiction, the Court has issued striking re-
bukes to lower courts for adopting too capacious a view of their au-
thority to adjudicate claims against out-of-state defendants.1 
In one area—general personal jurisdiction—the Court has 
adopted a bright line rule. General jurisdiction over a corporation ex-
ists only in a corporation’s home state2—essentially, its state of incor-
poration or principal place of business.3 All but Justice Sotomayor 
seem pleased with the categorical quality of the rule and its strong 
warning to aggressive forum shoppers and lower courts inclined to 
accommodate them.4 
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 1. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Ca., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 2. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.  
 3. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137, 139 n.19 (2014).  
 4. Compare id. at 157–59 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), with id. at 137 (majority 
explaining “that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant 
amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there,” and noting that simple jurisdictional rules 
promote predictability); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1788–89 (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting).  
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Decisions on specific personal jurisdiction have seemed equally 
striking to many court-watchers,5 and they convey a similar distrust 
of forum shopping. But while some of the Court’s negative messages 
come through clearly, its overall perspective on specific personal ju-
risdiction remains hazy. The Justices know what they don’t like,6 but 
they have made less progress in specifying what they do like. 
With one exception. Beginning with Justice Ginsburg’s 2011 opin-
ion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown,7 and echoed in Jus-
tice Thomas’s 2014 opinion in Walden v. Fiore8 and Justice Alito’s 2017 
opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court,9 the Court has sug-
gested that what is distinctive about specific jurisdiction is that it is 
“case-linked.”10 Thus, it seems that if one could offer an adequate ac-
count of the nature of the linkage in case-linked jurisdiction, one might 
see a way forward. This is what has been missing,11 and it is what this 
article provides. 
We are not the first to identify the question and to address it head 
on. Indeed, one of America’s repeat-player litigants—Ford Motor 
Company—has, in litigation currently before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
offered the Justices a seemingly sharp-edged answer to the question 
 
 5. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (2018) (following Bristol-Myers Squibb); Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Ra-
tionality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (2018) (same); Robin J. Effron, 
Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867 (2012) (following J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)). 
 6. For example, they do not like specific jurisdiction premised solely on the 
plaintiff’s contact with the forum state. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). 
Nor do they like a sliding scale approach that merges general jurisdiction with specific 
jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.  
 7. 564 U.S. at 919 (“Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International Shoe 
decision have differentiated between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific 
or case-linked jurisdiction.”).  
 8. 571 U.S. at 283 n.6 (“‘Specific’ or ‘case-linked’ jurisdiction ‘depends on an af-
filiatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy’ (i.e., an ‘activity or an 
occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s 
regulation’). . . . This is in contrast to ‘general’ or ‘all purpose’ jurisdiction, which per-
mits a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection unre-
lated to the underlying suit (e.g., domicile).”).  
 9. 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (“Since our seminal decision in International Shoe, our de-
cisions have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ (sometimes called 
‘all-purpose’) jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) jurisdiction.”).  
 10. See id. 
 11. See Lea Brilmayer, A General Look at Specific Jurisdiction, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 
ONLINE 1, 5 (2017) (“There is little in the way of clear standards for what makes a con-
tact with the forum ‘related to’ the litigation or qualifies a dispute as ‘arising out of’ the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.”). 
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of what “case-linked jurisdiction” requires.12 In its briefs in Ford Motor 
Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,13 and Bandemer v. Ford 
Motor Co.,14 Ford has argued that specific jurisdiction requires that a 
defendant’s minimum contacts with the state function as a “proximate 
cause” of the incident giving rise to the litigation.15 Because the Re-
spondents in both of these cases allege injuries by Ford cars that were 
first sold outside of the forum state, Ford argues that, despite its ample 
contacts with each state, both suits fail the proximate cause test, such 
that personal jurisdiction is lacking.16 Hence, they are asking the Court 
to reverse the high courts of Montana and Minnesota, each of which 
held that its courts could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over 
Ford.17 The Solicitor General and other amici have, in parallel fashion, 
suggested that the defendants’ contacts must have been a but-for 
cause of the incident spawning the litigation, and that Ford wins on 
this alternative causation-based rendering of case-linkage.18 
The Ford cases have an intuitively correct answer, however, and 
it is neither Ford’s nor the Solicitor General’s. A Minnesotan suing 
Ford on a claim that he was injured when a Ford vehicle’s airbags mal-
functioned in Minnesota should not be shut out of the Minnesota 
courts on grounds of personal jurisdiction, given that Ford advertises, 
markets, and sells many vehicles in Minnesota. Nor should the family 
of a Montana decedent suing Ford on a claim that she died in the roll-
over of a Ford vehicle in Montana be shut out of the Montana courts 
on grounds of personal jurisdiction, given that Ford advertises, mar-
kets, and sells many vehicles in Montana. Properly interpreted, Su-
preme Court precedents elaborating the content of due process re-
strictions on personal jurisdiction allow the Minnesota and Montana 
courts to hear these products liability suits. Indeed, when the jurisdic-
tional question is stated plainly, the answer seems so obvious that it 
is hard to fathom any common-sense argument to the contrary.  
 
 12. Brief for Petitioner, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 140 S. 
Ct. 917 (Nos. 19-368, 19-369) (Jan. 17, 2020), 2020 WL 1154744. 
 13. 443 P.3d 407 (Mont. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-368, 140 S. Ct. 917 (Jan. 17, 
2020). 
 14. 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-369, 140 S. Ct. 916 (Jan. 
17, 2020). 
 15. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 44.  
 16. Id. at 45–48. 
 17. Id. at 2.  
 18. See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26–
32, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 917 (Nos. 19-368, 19-
369) (Jan. 17, 2020), 2020 WL 1478612.  
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This is one of those situations where the intuitively correct an-
swer is the right answer. The account we put forward explains why, 
under current doctrine, the courts of Minnesota and Montana have 
personal jurisdiction over Ford in the cases before the Supreme Court. 
By contrast, Ford’s causation-based account, though superficially at-
tractive, rests on a basic misunderstanding of case-linkage. If the 
Court were to adopt Ford’s approach, it would unduly hinder state 
sovereignty, overextend due process constraints, and undermine 
courts’ ability to achieve a sensible allocation of adjudicatory author-
ity. 
The principal goals of this article are constructive and interpre-
tive, not critical or prescriptive. We aim to derive a sound theory of 
case-linkage from the Court’s precedents and its reasoning about two 
pillars of personal jurisdiction: state sovereignty and due process. 
Part I begins the analysis by reviewing the Court’s personal jurisdic-
tion decisions from International Shoe v. Washington19 to the present 
with the goal of understanding the linkage concept as it has played out 
in the cases. Part II describes the Ford cases now at the Court.  
Part III provides our theoretical explanation of the core princi-
ples of case-linked jurisdiction. There we show that two related but 
distinct concepts are embedded in the idea of linkage—a concept of 
the scope of the defendant’s submission to state authority, and a con-
cept of the scope of the forum state’s interest. It is the latter concept, 
pertaining to the forum state’s interest, that plays a critical role in its 
most recent case-linked jurisdiction decision, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
v. Superior Court.20 Without describing it as such, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
relied upon what we refer to as the “anti-busybody principle”—the 
principle that a state’s courts ought not meddle in affairs in which they 
lack sufficient interest.21 By explaining case-linkage both in terms of 
the scope of a defendant’s submission to state power and in terms of 
the scope of a state’s interest, we offer a way to bring together the due 
process and sovereignty concerns that underlie the law of personal 
jurisdiction. Part IV compares our framework to the alternatives, 
showing that causation-based approaches fail to capture the rele-
vance of case-linkage in jurisdictional analysis. 
 
 19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 20. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 21. Id. at 1780. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Court relied on the case-linkage ele-
ment to hold that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
for the claims of non-California plaintiffs (even though it could assert personal juris-
diction over the defendant for the claims of California plaintiffs), but the case did not 
require the Court to spell out the meaning of the case-linkage element, and the Court 
did not do so. 
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I.  HISTORY OF THE CASE-LINKAGE ELEMENT IN SPECIFIC 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION   
A careful review of modern personal jurisdiction decisions re-
veals that, although not always emphasized or identified as such, the 
case-linkage element has been a fixture of those decisions ever since 
the Court began distinguishing between what is today called “general” 
and “specific” jurisdiction. The latter distinction traces back to the 
foundational decision of International Shoe v. Washington.22 In that 
case, the Supreme Court reasoned that, when corporate presence 
within a state is not “so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely dis-
tinct from those activities”23 (what is now called “general jurisdic-
tion”), the state’s courts might nonetheless assert personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant based on less pervasive contacts.24 If so, 
however, such jurisdiction exists only for claims that “arise out of or 
are connected with”25 the defendant’s contacts with the forum state 
(what is now called “specific jurisdiction”). The Court explained the 
latter idea in terms of reciprocity: 
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activ-
ities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that 
state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as 
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the 
state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit 
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.26 
In 1966, Professors von Mehren & Trautman coined the terms 
“general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction.”27 Following Interna-
tional Shoe, they described specific jurisdiction as “the assertion of 
power to adjudicate . . . matters arising out of — or intimately related 
to — the affiliating circumstances on which the jurisdictional claim is 
based.”28  
The Court recently restated the distinction between two types of 
personal jurisdiction this way in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior 
Court, offering its strongest statement yet of the case-linkage compo-
nent of specific jurisdiction: 
 
 22. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 23. Id. at 318. 
 24. Id. at 319. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
 27. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). 
 28. Id. at 1144–45. 
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Since our seminal decision in International Shoe, our decisions have recog-
nized two types of personal jurisdiction: “general” (sometimes called “all-
purpose”) jurisdiction and “specific” (sometimes called “case-linked”) juris-
diction. . . . A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that 
defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a differ-
ent State. . . . Specific jurisdiction is very different. In order for a state court 
to exercise specific jurisdiction, “the suit” must “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” In other words, there must be “an 
affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, 
[an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is there-
fore subject to the State’s regulation.” For this reason, “specific jurisdiction is 
confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very 
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”29 
So defined, specific personal jurisdiction encompasses two ele-
ments: (1) a contact element (often stated in terms of “minimum con-
tacts” or “purposeful availment”), and (2) a case-linkage element 
(sometimes stated in terms of “arising out of or related to”).30 The 
question of what sort of contacts suffice under the minimum contacts 
test has been considered by the Court in a long and now-familiar se-
quence of decisions. The question of what sort of case-link is required, 
however, has received little elaboration.  
International Shoe31 was an example of case-linked personal ju-
risdiction. In hindsight, both the contact element and the case-linkage 
element were easily satisfied—the suit sought recovery from the de-
fendant of unpaid contributions to Washington’s unemployment com-
pensation fund based on the defendant’s regular sale of its products 
in state with the help of an in-state sales force—even though the Court 
had not yet developed a vocabulary for breaking down the analysis in 
this way.32 A few years later, the Court decided Perkins v. Benguet 
 
 29. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779–80 (2017) (citations omitted) (emphases and parenthe-
ticals in original). In the intervening years, the Court had begun using the terms specific 
and general jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984) (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 27). 
 30. For purposes of this discussion, we leave aside a third element of case-linked 
jurisdiction, often described as the “reasonableness” or “fairness” requirement, which 
the Court has suggested can function as an independent basis for a court to reject ju-
risdiction even if the contact element and case-linkage element are satisfied. See Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Ca., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (rejecting personal ju-
risdiction on the basis of unreasonableness); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462, 477–78 (1985) (describing the reasonableness analysis but not deciding the case 
on this basis). See also Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction: The Walls Blocking an 
Appeal to Rationality, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 99, 116 (2019) (“Plaintiffs may appeal 
to [the fairness or reasonableness factors] only after scaling the wall imposed by the 
‘contact’ requirement. Those who do must scale the emerging wall imposed by the ‘re-
latedness’ requirement.”). 
 31. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 32. Id. at 320 (concluding that defendant’s “systematic and continuous” contacts 
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Consolidated Mining Co.33 The plaintiff sued in Ohio on a claim that she 
was owed money as a stockholder of the Benguet Consolidated Mining 
Company, based in the Philippines.34 Although neither the term “all-
purpose jurisdiction” nor “general jurisdiction” was yet in use, the 
Court emphasized that “[t]he cause of action sued upon did not arise 
in Ohio and does not relate to the corporation’s activities there.”35 The 
Court thus demanded a higher level of contact, which it found in the 
president’s establishment in Ohio of the company’s wartime head-
quarters.36 
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,37 the Court held that 
even a single contact may suffice for personal jurisdiction if it bears 
the right relation to the suit in question.38 A Texas-based insurance 
company, having assumed the insurance obligations of an Arizona 
company, mailed a life insurance contract to a policyholder in Califor-
nia.39 It was the company’s only contact with California.40 The policy-
holder’s beneficiary sued the company in California for breach of con-
tract when the company refused to pay on a claim after the 
policyholder died.41 Holding that California constitutionally could ex-
ercise jurisdiction over the Texas defendant to adjudicate this claim, 
the Supreme Court emphasized the state’s interest in providing re-
dress, particularly to its residents: 
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effec-
tive means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay 
claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced 
to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally 
accountable.42 
 
with the state, which resulted in a “large volume of interstate business,” provided the 
basis for jurisdiction over a suit seeking to enforce a legal obligation that “arose out of 
those very activities.”). 
 33. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 34. Id. at 438–39.  
 35. Id. at 438; see also id. at 440 (framing the issue as whether Ohio courts could 
proceed in personam “to enforce a cause of action not arising in Ohio and not related 
to the business or activities of the corporation in that State”); id. at 446 (“The instant 
case takes us one step further to a proceeding in personam to enforce a cause of action 
not arising out of the corporation’s activities in the state of the forum.”). 
 36. Id. at 447–49.  
 37. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 38. Id. at 223–24. 
 39. Id. at 221–22. 
 40. Id. at 222.  
 41. Id. at 221–22. 
 42. Id. at 223 (emphasis added). 
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In several cases where the Supreme Court has rejected a plain-
tiff’s attempt to establish specific personal jurisdiction, the Court 
reached its result purely on the minimum contacts element without 
regard to the case-linkage element. In Hanson v. Denckla,43 the Court 
held that a Delaware trustee could not be haled into Florida court be-
cause the trustee had not transacted any business there and thus 
“[t]he cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an act 
done or transaction consummated in the forum State.”44 In World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,45 the Court found that a New York 
automobile retailer and New York area distributor lacked minimum 
contacts with Oklahoma, and therefore the Oklahoma courts could not 
exercise personal jurisdiction over these sellers even though the 
claims arose out of an accident in Oklahoma.46 Although Oklahoma 
was the most convenient forum for litigating the dispute, the Court 
held that the state could not exercise personal jurisdiction over either 
of these defendants because neither had sufficient purposeful contact 
with Oklahoma: “[T]he Due Process Clause ‘does not contemplate that 
a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individ-
ual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, 
or relations.’”47  
By contrast, in cases where the Court has upheld specific jurisdic-
tion, it has necessarily found the case-linkage element satisfied, either 
explicitly or implicitly. In Calder v. Jones,48 the Court upheld personal 
jurisdiction in California to adjudicate a defamation claim against a 
Florida writer and editor who had written an article about a celebrity 
who resided in California.49 Because the defendants knowingly pro-
duced a story about a California celebrity using California sources, and 
because the reputational harm would occur above all in California, the 
Court found the minimum contacts test satisfied.50 Equally essential, 
although not the focus of its opinion, the Court deemed the case-
 
 43. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 44. Id. at 251. 
 45. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 46. Id. at 299. 
 47. Id. at 294 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 
(1945)). 
 48. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 49. Id. at 785–86, 791. 
 50. Id. at 788–89 (“The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities 
of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose tele-
vision career was centered in California. The article was drawn from California 
sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s emotional distress 
and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California.”). 
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linkage element met—the suit clearly related to the defendants’ con-
tacts with California.51 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine52 similarly involved a defamation 
claim. Unlike the suit in Calder, which Jones filed in her home state at 
which arguably the offending article was aimed,53 Keeton did not file 
suit in the courts of a state with an especially strong interest in the 
claim, as compared with other states.54 Keeton, a New York resident, 
sued Ohio-based Hustler Magazine in New Hampshire to avail herself 
of New Hampshire’s longer limitations period.55 Even so, Hustler sold 
numerous magazines in the state just as it did in every other state, and 
the article could impose reputational harm in the state just as it could 
in every other state.56  
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,57 the Court re-
turned to the question of all-purpose jurisdiction, but in the process 
shed light on the requirements for specific jurisdiction.58 Specifically, 
the Court found the link element unsatisfied and therefore focused on 
all-purpose jurisdiction as the only potential basis for an assertion of 
state judicial power over the defendant.59 As in Perkins v. Benguet Con-
solidated Mining Co.,60 the Court viewed the claim in Helicopteros as “a 
cause of action not arising out of or related to the corporation’s activ-
ities within the State.”61 Plaintiffs had filed wrongful death actions in 
Texas based on deaths that occurred in a helicopter crash in Peru.62 
Although the defendant Helicol had significant contacts with Texas—
including negotiations, purchases, and training—the majority found 
that the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims were inadequately linked to 
Texas to support specific jurisdiction as a prelude to its rejection of 
any assertion of general jurisdiction.63  
 
 51. Id. at 788 (“Here, the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the defendants 
out of which the suit arises.”) (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)). 
 52. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 53. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89. 
 54. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773–74.  
 55. Id. at 772–73.  
 56. Id. at 776–77. 
 57. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 58. Id. at 413–15. 
 59. Id. at 415. 
 60. 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952). 
 61. 466. U.S. at 409. 
 62. Id. at 409–10. 
 63. Id. at 415 (“All parties to the present case concede that respondents’ claims 
against Helicol did not ‘arise out of,’ and are not related to, Helicol’s activities within 
Texas.”). Although Justice Brennan, in dissent, urged that Helicol’s contacts with Texas 
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In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,64 the Court upheld specific per-
sonal jurisdiction in Florida over franchisees located in Michigan for 
Burger King’s claim that they breached the franchise agreement.65 
Burger King was headquartered in Florida and, among other things, 
its franchise agreement contained a Florida choice-of-law clause.66 
The defendants argued that the Florida court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over them because the claim did not arise in Florida.67 The Court 
rejected this argument: 
A State generally has a “manifest interest” in providing its residents with a 
convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors. 
Moreover, where individuals “purposefully derive benefit” from their inter-
state activities, it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to ac-
count in other States for consequences that arise proximately from such ac-
tivities; the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial 
shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.68 
After its flurry of decisions on specific personal jurisdiction in the 
1980s69 and then a lull,70 the Supreme Court reentered the arena with 
gusto in 2011. Two decisions—J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro71 
and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown72—signaled that there 
would be no dramatic expansion of personal jurisdiction, notwith-
standing changes in communications, transportation, and global inter-
change that one might have thought would warrant such an expan-
sion. Indeed, Nicastro’s splintered opinions called into question the 
viability of the stream-of-commerce theory to satisfy the minimum 
contacts test,73 and Goodyear introduced the restrictive home-state 
 
were related to the plaintiffs’ claims, see id. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the major-
ity declined to reach this question because the parties had not raised it. Id. at 415 n.10. 
 64. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 65. Id. at 463–64, 487. 
 66. Id. at 464–66. 
 67. See id. at 469. 
 68. Id. at 473–74 (citations omitted). 
 69. See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Ca., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton 
v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 70. In the interim, the Court decided Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 
U.S. 604 (1990), which upheld personal jurisdiction over an individual based on in-
state service of process, and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), 
which enforced a forum-selection clause. 
 71. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 72. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 73. 564 U.S. at 881–83 (holding that the “defendant’s transmission of goods per-
mits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted 
the forum . . . it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods 
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test for all-purpose jurisdiction over corporations.74 These decisions 
can be seen as part of a broad retrenchment in civil procedure occur-
ring around the same time:75 one that included restrictive holdings 
and rules on pleadings,76 discovery,77 class certification,78 and litiga-
tion-avoidance through arbitration clauses.79 But the post-2010 cases 
can also be seen as a continuation of the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence, keeping fundamental principles intact from earlier 
cases.  
Nicastro and Goodyear—as well as the Supreme Court personal 
jurisdiction cases that have followed them—sharpened the pair of dis-
tinctions central to jurisdictional due process analysis, namely, the 
distinction between all-purpose and specific jurisdiction, and the dis-
tinction, within specific jurisdiction, between the minimum contacts 
element and the case-linkage element. In Goodyear and then Daimler 
AG v. Bauman,80 the Court doubled down on the distinction between 
all-purpose and specific jurisdiction, holding that all-purpose jurisdic-
tion could be used only in a defendant’s home state.81 In Nicastro and 
then Walden v. Fiore,82 the Court reaffirmed that the contact element 
can be met only by a showing that the defendant acted purposefully 
toward the forum state.83 And finally, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Su-
perior Court,84 the Court affirmed the importance of the case-linkage 
element, holding that even if a defendant has purposefully established 
 
will reach the forum State.”). 
 74. 564 U.S. at 919, 924. 
 75. See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: 
THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017). 
 76. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 77. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (amended 2016) (highlighting proportionality as a constraint 
on the scope of discovery). 
 78. See generally Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 79. See generally Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Am. Express Co. 
v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333 (2011); Pamela Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV. 
1119 (2019). 
 80. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 81. Id. at 127; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 
(2011).  
 82. 571 U.S. 277 (2014). 
 83. Id. at 285; J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011). 
 84. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
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contacts with the forum state, specific jurisdiction is unavailable for 
claims that are insufficiently linked to those contacts.85 
Despite the splintered Court in Nicastro,86 none of the Justices ex-
pressed any doubt about the importance of the link between the 
events underlying plaintiff Robert Nicastro’s claim and the forum 
state of New Jersey. Nicastro suffered a serious injury at his place of 
employment in New Jersey; four of his fingers were severed on a 
metal-shearing machine.87 The machine was manufactured in England 
by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (“McIntyre”), an English company.88 But 
the manufacturer had not sold the machine directly to Nicastro’s em-
ployer in New Jersey.89 Rather, the manufacturer sold the machine to 
its distributer in Ohio, who in turn sold it to the employer.90  
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion recited the facts that McIn-
tyre did not market or sell any products directly to New Jersey and 
that no more than four of its machines—perhaps only the one machine 
at issue in this case—ended up in the state.91 With extensive citations 
to Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen, the opinion then concluded 
that minimum contacts were absent:  
Due process protects petitioner’s right to be subject only to lawful authority. 
At no time did petitioner engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an 
intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws. New Jersey is with-
out power to adjudge the rights and liabilities of J. McIntyre, and its exercise 
of jurisdiction would violate due process.92 
At a higher level of generality, the plurality framed the question 
of personal jurisdiction as a matter of whether the defendant, by its 
conduct, had submitted to the state’s authority: 
A person may submit to a State’s authority in a number of ways. There is, of 
course, explicit consent. . . . There is also a more limited form of submission 
to a State’s authority for disputes that “arise out of or are connected with the 
activities within the state.” Where a defendant “purposefully avails itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws,” it submits to the judicial power of an 
otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is exercised in connec-
tion with the defendant’s activities touching on the State. In other words, sub-
mission through contact with and activity directed at a sovereign may justify 
 
 85. Id. at 1782. 
 86. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 87. Id. at 894–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 878. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 887. 
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specific jurisdiction “in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum.”93 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence, joined by Justice Alito, similarly 
concluded that the contact element was unmet.94 Declining to look be-
yond the facts in the record, Justice Breyer noted that “Mr. Nicastro, 
who here bears the burden of proving jurisdiction, has shown no spe-
cific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey.”95 Argua-
bly, the Breyer concurrence—as the narrowest reasoning that sup-
ports the conclusion of no jurisdiction—states the rule of the Nicastro 
case.96 Justice Breyer explicitly declined to make any “broad pro-
nouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.”97 If so, Nicas-
tro’s holding can be stated this way: A manufacturer is not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in a state where its product causes injury if the 
manufacturer has never sold anything directly into the state, and if 
only one item has made its way indirectly from the manufacturer into 
the state.  
The plurality and concurrence did not speak to the case-linkage 
element because they found the contact element unsatisfied.98 By con-
trast, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, having found sufficiently purposeful 
contact in the manufacturer’s targeting of the entire United States, ad-
dressed linkage in memorable language: “On what sensible view of the 
allocation of adjudicatory authority could the place of Nicastro’s in-
jury within the United States be deemed off limits for his products lia-
bility claim against a foreign manufacturer who targeted the United 
States (including all the States that constitute the Nation) as the terri-
tory it sought to develop?”99  
The same year as Nicastro, the Court decided Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations v. Brown.100 The Court’s analysis in Goodyear focused 
on all-purpose jurisdiction and introduced the home-state test for all-
 
 93. Id. at 880–81 (citations omitted); see also id. at 884 (“The question is whether 
a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy exist-
ing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to 
subject the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”). 
 94. Id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at 889. 
 96. Cf. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. . . .’”) (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).  
 97. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 887–88 (Kennedy J.) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 898 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 100. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 
2020] CASE-LINKED JURISDICTION 67 
 
purpose jurisdiction over corporations.101 On the way to its holding 
about general jurisdiction, however, the Court rejected the application 
of specific jurisdiction.102 The case involved a bus rollover accident in 
France in which two children from North Carolina were killed.103 The 
decedents’ parents filed a products liability suit in North Carolina, in-
cluding as defendants three foreign subsidiaries of the Goodyear Tire 
and Rubber Company that operated in Turkey, France, and Luxem-
bourg.104 Although some tires made by these companies had reached 
North Carolina in the stream of commerce,105 it was uncontested that 
the type of tire involved in the accident was never distributed in North 
Carolina, and the lawsuit had nothing to do with tires that had reached 
North Carolina. “Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, oc-
curred in France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was 
manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.”106  
In Daimler AG v. Bauman,107 the Supreme Court returned to the 
issue of all-purpose jurisdiction, solidifying Goodyear’s home-state 
test. As in Goodyear, the Court easily set aside the plaintiff’s specific 
jurisdiction argument on its way to addressing the question of all-pur-
pose jurisdiction.108 Twenty-two Argentinian plaintiffs had filed suit 
in California109 against the giant German automobile manufacturer, 
Daimler-Chrysler AG (“Daimler”), claiming that Daimler’s subsidiary, 
Mercedes-Benz Argentina, had collaborated in human rights abuses 
during Argentina’s “dirty war” of 1976-83.110 It appeared that Daimler 
had significant contacts with California, particularly through its 
 
 101. Id. at 919, 924. 
 102. Id. at 919. 
 103. Id. at 920. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 919. 
 107. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 108. Id. at 133 (“Plaintiffs have never attempted to fit this case into the specific ju-
risdiction category.”) (emphasis in original). 
 109. Id. at 120–21. Daimler was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California. Id. Similarly, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz and Walden v. Fiore were 
in federal court rather than state court. 571 U.S. 277, 281 (2014); 471 U.S. 462, 464 
(1985). The fact that these cases were in federal court rather than state court did not 
significantly alter the personal jurisdiction analysis because Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 4(k) generally defines the territorial limits of effective service of process in 
terms of whether a state court in the same state would have personal jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125 (“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining 
the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). 
 110. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 121.  
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subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, which sold many vehicles in the 
state.111 What was missing, however, was any link between these 
plaintiffs’ claims and California: “The question presented is whether 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the 
District Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case, 
given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, per-
petrators, or victims described in the complaint.”112 The Court con-
cluded that California lacked all-purpose jurisdiction over Daimler be-
cause it was not the company’s home state.113 In doing so, it 
emphasized that a finding of personal jurisdiction on the facts of the 
case would allow California to meddle in distant affairs over which the 
state has no legitimate interest: “If Daimler’s California activities suf-
ficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in California, 
the same global reach would presumably be available in every other 
State in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable.”114  
Next, in Walden v. Fiore,115 the Supreme Court returned to the 
contact element of specific jurisdiction, on which it had rejected juris-
diction in Hanson, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Nicastro. The plain-
tiffs brought suit in Nevada against a Georgia police officer, asserting 
claims based on the officer’s seizure of their cash at a Georgia air-
port.116 Although the plaintiffs resided in Nevada and claimed that the 
seizure caused them harm when they lacked access to funds in their 
home state, the Court found that the defendant lacked sufficiently pur-
poseful contact with Nevada to satisfy the minimum contacts test, em-
phasizing that “it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the neces-
sary connection with the forum state.”117 “In short, when viewed 
through the proper lens—whether the defendant’s actions connect 
him to the forum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant con-
tacts with Nevada.”118 
Finally, we arrive at the only case to date in which the Supreme 
Court’s decision actually focused on the case-linkage element. In Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,119 the Court held that California 
 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 122. 
 114. Id. at 139. 
 115. 571 U.S. 277 (2014). 
 116. Id. at 279–81. 
 117. Id. at 285. 
 118. Id. at 289 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 290 (“Respondents’ claimed 
injury does not evince a connection between petitioner and Nevada. [The injury] is not 
the sort of effect that is tethered to Nevada in any meaningful way.”). 
 119. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
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lacked personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMS) for 
pharmaceutical products liability claims of non-Californians, even as 
California had jurisdiction over the company for the claims of Califor-
nians.120 All of the claims concerned the company’s Plavix medication, 
which the company marketed widely throughout the United States.121 
There was no doubt that BMS had substantial purposeful contacts 
with California. The company operated research and laboratory facil-
ities in California, employed hundreds of sales representatives in the 
state, and had sold well over 100 million Plavix pills in California.122 
What was missing was an adequate link between the company’s con-
tacts with California and the claims of the non-California plaintiffs: 
The State Supreme Court found that specific jurisdiction was present without 
identifying any adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’ claims. 
As noted, the nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not 
purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not 
injured by Plavix in California.123 
California lacked all-purpose jurisdiction over BMS because Cali-
fornia was not the company’s home state (BMS is incorporated in Del-
aware and headquartered in New York).124 It lacked specific jurisdic-
tion over BMS for the claims of the non-Californians because, despite 
the company’s contacts with California, the majority saw the non-Cal-
ifornia plaintiffs’ claims as having no connection to California other 
than the fact that they had filed their lawsuit there.125 As Justice Alito 
explained for the majority, the due process standard for personal ju-
risdiction is not merely about convenience, “but it also encompasses 
the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a 
State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in ques-
tion.”126 
Looking back at the modern line of Supreme Court personal juris-
diction cases,127 the structure of the analysis is clear. As a matter of 
federal constitutional law, in personam jurisdiction requires—in the 
 
 120. Id. at 1782–83.  
 121. Id. at 1778. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1781; see also id. at 1778 (“The nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that 
they obtained Plavix through California physicians or from any other California source; 
nor did they claim that they were injured by Plavix or were treated for their injuries in 
California.”). 
 124. Id. at 1777–78. 
 125. Id. at 1781. 
 126. Id. at 1780. 
 127. Here, we focus on the central lines of personal jurisdiction analysis, and we 
leave aside any cases based on consent, individual in-state service of process, or in rem 
power over in-state property. 
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absence of consent, or the service of process on an individual while 
physically present in the forum state—conduct by which a defendant 
submits to a state’s adjudicatory authority. Such submission may be 
either all-purpose or specific. All-purpose jurisdiction over an individ-
ual is limited to the state of domicile, and all-purpose jurisdiction over 
a corporation is limited to its “home.” Absent all-purpose jurisdiction, 
a state’s courts can only entertain claims in a manner consistent with 
the requirements of specific jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction in turn 
requires that two elements be satisfied—(1) the minimum contacts 
element and (2) the case-linkage element. What counts as a sufficient 
contact has been exhaustively explored by the Court, although im-
portant questions remain unanswered. What counts as a sufficient 
linkage, by contrast, has barely been explored, although the Court has 
offered hints. 
 II.  THE FORD CASES   
The pair of Ford cases for which certiorari was granted last term 
must be understood against the backdrop just provided. The Montana 
case concerns Markkaya Gullett, a Montana resident killed when her 
1996 Ford Explorer rolled over on a Montana highway.128 The wrong-
ful death action brought by Charles Lucero on behalf of Gullett asserts 
claims based on strict products liability and negligence.129 It contends, 
among other things, that the relevant model of Ford Explorer had a 
design defect rendering it prone to rollovers.130 In this respect, the 
Montana suit is like hundreds of claims brought against Ford for fatal 
accidents. However, Gullett’s Ford had originally been sold by an in-
dependent Ford dealer in Washington State, not in Montana, and it 
had been purchased as a used car from a non-Ford dealer in Mon-
tana.131 Ford argued on this basis that specific personal jurisdiction in 
Montana was lacking.132 The Supreme Court of Montana unanimously 
 
 128. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 443 P.3d 407, 411 (Mont. 
2019), cert. granted, No. 19-368, 140 S. Ct. 917 (Jan. 17, 2020). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. In both the Montana and Minnesota cases, the Ford vehicles had been re-
sold more than once and presumably had significant “wear and tear.” As a matter of 
products liability doctrine, the age and resale history does not preclude a strict liability 
claim against the manufacturer, but heightens the importance of the requirement that 
plaintiff bear the burden of proving that the defect existed when it left Ford’s hands. In 
circumstances like these, a trial often focuses on design defects or failure to warn, ra-
ther than manufacturing defects. Indeed, rollover and airbag litigation typically fo-
cuses on the former theories, not the latter. 
 132. Id. 
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disagreed, stating that “a nexus exists between the product and the 
defendant’s in-state activity” and that “the defendant could have rea-
sonably foreseen its product being used in Montana” in light of its ex-
tensive sales and marketing of Ford vehicles in Montana.133 
Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co.134 is a companion case from Minne-
sota. Adam Bandemer was seriously injured when, sitting in the front 
passenger seat of a 1994 Ford Crown Victoria, the passenger-side air-
bag failed to deploy during a collision that occurred in Minnesota.135 
Bandemer, like the driver of the vehicle as well as its owner, was a 
Minnesota resident.136 He asserted products liability, negligence, and 
breach of warranty claims against Ford.137 However, the Crown Victo-
ria in which Bandemer was injured had originally been sold in North 
Dakota, not Minnesota; it had subsequently been purchased as a used 
car in Minnesota.138 The fact of the car’s initial out-of-state sale pre-
cluded Minnesota from exercising specific jurisdiction over it, Ford 
again argued.139 In a 5-2 decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court also 
rejected this argument, concluding that “[b]ecause there is a substan-
tial connection between the defendant Ford, the forum Minnesota, and 
the claims brought by Bandemer, Ford’s contacts with Minnesota suf-
fice to establish specific personal jurisdiction over the company re-
garding Bandemer’s claims.”140 
The Supreme Court granted Ford’s petition for certiorari.141 This 
was not entirely surprising. There is confusion among courts on how 
to analyze specific jurisdiction. While all jurisdictions accept that spe-
cific jurisdiction depends upon a satisfactory connection—often fram-
ing the inquiry in terms of the “relationship among the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation” and in terms of whether the claims “arise out 
of or relate to” the defendant’s in-state contacts—jurisdictions have 
varied in exactly how they interpret this requirement. Some courts 
have interpreted these phrases to demand a “proximate cause” rela-
tionship between the defendant’s in-state contacts and the case before 
 
 133. Id. at 416. 
 134. Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019), cert. granted, No. 
19-369, 140 S. Ct. 916 (Jan. 17, 2020). 
 135. Id. at 748. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 757–58 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 748. 
 140. Id. at 755.  
 141. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 917 (Jan. 17, 
2020); Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (Jan. 17, 2020). 
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the court.142 Others have contended that “proximate cause” is the 
wrong test, and required instead “but for” causation.143 And other 
courts still reject the idea of a causation requirement.144 
As noted, Ford urges a proximate cause standard.145 Numerous 
amici from the business community have urged the Court to side with 
Ford (but not all have).146 The gist of Ford’s argument is stated in its 
summary: “Because due process requires suit-related contacts, the 
arise-out-of-or-relate-to requirement is met only if the defendant’s fo-
rum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims.”147 In the substance of 
the brief, Ford spells out its reasoning:  
A causal test locates jurisdiction in those States that have a regulatory inter-
est in the plaintiff’s claims because it grounds jurisdiction in an act the de-
fendant itself took inside or purposefully aimed at a State that led to the plain-
tiff’s claims. The test, for example, permits the State where a defendant 
manufactured the product at issue in a plaintiff’s suit to exercise jurisdiction. 
That State has an interest in preventing the manufacture of harmful products 
within its borders and in not allowing companies to use the State’s resources 
to do so. The same goes for the State where a defendant designs or sells its 
product. Under a causal rule, States with an interest in regulating what Ford 
does within their borders will have jurisdiction when a plaintiff’s claims seek 
to do just that.148 
The Respondents’ Brief in Opposition opposes a causal test, argu-
ing that the Court has never before laid down a causal requirement 
(let alone a proximate causal requirement) for specific personal juris-
diction, and contending: 
This Court has repeatedly made clear that where (a) a company deliberately 
cultivates a market for a product in the forum state, and (b) that product 
causes an injury in the forum state, the relationship between the injury and 
 
 142. See, e.g., Beydoun v. Wataniya Rests. Holding, 768 F.3d 499, 507–08 (6th Cir. 
2014); Mass. Sch. of L. at Andover v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 143. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 
2003); Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995); Prejean v. 
Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981); see also Nowak 
v. Tak How Invs., 94 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1996) (referring to the Ninth Circuit as “the 
most forceful defender of the ‘but for’ test.”).  
 144. See, e.g., Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335–36 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000); Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 29–31 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 145. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 44. 
 146. See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of Am., the 
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., and the Am. Tort Reform Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 917 (Nos. 19-368, 
19-369) (Jan. 17, 2020), 2020 WL 1478608. But see Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 917 (Nos. 19-368, 19-369) (Jan. 17, 2020), 2020 WL 
1852280. 
 147. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 13 (emphasis in original). 
 148. Id. at 41. 
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the defendant’s in-state activity is sufficient for specific jurisdiction. The prin-
ciples that animate the relatedness requirement—fair warning and recipro-
cal obligation—strongly weigh in favor of jurisdiction in this paradigmatic 
scenario, regardless of where the particular widget that caused injury in the 
forum happened to have first been sold.149 
Respondents argue that Ford’s proposed test goes beyond the Court’s 
decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb, pointing out that petitioners in that 
case asked the Court to adopt a causation test and it declined to do 
so.150 
On our view, each side has valid points, but neither side captures 
the jurisdictional values at stake. The Respondents are correct that the 
Court’s precedents do not dictate a causal test; they are correct that 
Bristol-Myers Squibb and Nicastro—and indeed all other Court deci-
sions declining to find specific jurisdiction—are distinguishable; and 
they are correct that selecting the notoriously elusive concept of 
“proximate cause” will not enhance clarity. On the other hand, Ford is 
correct that many lower courts have adopted some form of causation 
rule; it is correct that International Shoe and Keeton—and indeed all 
other Court decisions finding specific jurisdiction—are distinguisha-
ble; and it is correct that there is something of a mess in the lower 
courts, such that clarification would be useful. Unfortunately, none of 
the parties has put forward an affirmative account of the basic princi-
ples underlying case-linked jurisdiction and the framework of re-
quirements that would give force to these principles. 
III.  THE TWO PRINCIPLES EMBEDDED IN THE CASE-LINKAGE 
ELEMENT   
In this Part we explain that the key to making sense of—and 
hence properly applying—the Court’s conception of personal jurisdic-
tion is to grasp that there are two distinctions, operating at two differ-
ent levels, built into the idea of specific or case-linked jurisdiction. 
First, specific jurisdiction involves two elements: (1) minimum con-
tacts and (2) case-linkage. Second, the case-linkage element itself has 
two aspects: (a) the scope of a defendant’s submission to the forum 
state’s power and (b) the scope of the forum state’s interest. These two 
aspects of case-linkage correspond to and articulate two principles: 
one involving defendant submission to a forum state and one involv-
ing scrutiny of the legitimate interests of forum states.  
 
 149. Brief of Respondents at 10, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 
140 S. Ct. 917 (No. 19-398, 19-369) (Jan. 17, 2020), 2020 WL 1531238. 
 150. Id. at 25–26. 
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Our goal in isolating the distinct ideas contained within standard 
phrasings is to explain how each serves a different function in the 
analysis of case-linked jurisdiction and thus to enable greater clarity 
and consistency in judicial decision-making. However, given that we 
break down the requirements for specific jurisdiction into two ele-
ments, and then further break down the second element into two as-
pects—all of which must be satisfied before jurisdiction is present—
some readers might be tempted to conclude that we have fashioned 
an especially defendant-friendly test. In fact, our analysis lacks any 
such valence. Indeed, as we demonstrate below, it explains precisely 
why the Court in the Ford cases should affirm the lower courts’ find-
ings of jurisdiction.  
A. RELATION AMONG DEFENDANT, FORUM, AND LITIGATION 
The duality of case-linkage and the two principles underlying it 
generate a range of ambiguities built into the standard ways of dis-
cussing specific jurisdiction. Courts—including the Supreme Court—
often describe the inquiry in terms of “the relationship among the de-
fendant, the forum, and the litigation.”151 This triangular phrase could 
imply three different two-part connections, a broader three-part con-
nection, or both. Because of this ambiguity, the phrase ultimately does 
not help refine the analysis, even as it gets much right. The phrase cor-
rectly but problematically encompasses both the contact element and 
the case-linkage element, and it correctly but problematically encom-
passes both the forum-state-interest aspect and the submission-to-
state-power aspect of the case-linkage element. To understand how 
case-linked jurisdiction works, we need to pull the phrase apart and 
understand the analysis step by step. 
Specific jurisdiction first requires a relationship between the de-
fendant and the forum. This is the minimum contacts requirement. 
Unless a defendant has “purposefully availed” itself of a forum state, 
the state cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant.152 
But beyond minimum contacts, specific jurisdiction requires that the 
litigation must be within the range of matters over which the defend-
ant’s purposeful contacts with the forum count as submission to the 
adjudicatory authority of the forum state and that the events giving 
rise to the litigation must give the forum state an adequate basis for 
 
 151. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (emphasis added); accord Walden 
v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984). 
 152. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985). 
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asserting its adjudicatory authority. These are related ideas. Both con-
cern case-linkage—and both can be described in terms of “the rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” How-
ever, they are distinct because one aspect looks at the question from 
the angle of the defendant’s purposeful contacts, and the other looks 
at the question from the angle of the forum state’s interest.153 
Because both aspects of case-linkage are in addition to the mini-
mum contacts requirement itself, and because both pertain to features 
of the individual case that concern the relationship between the de-
fendant and the forum state, these requirements often get subsumed 
in the single question of whether the claim “arises out of or relates to” 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. As noted, a major aim 
of this article is to isolate the distinct ideas contained within the stand-
ard phrasings by explaining how each aspect serves a different func-
tion in the analysis of case-linked jurisdiction. 
B. THE ANTI-BUSYBODY PRINCIPLE 
Until the Court’s recent revisitations of personal jurisdiction, the 
overwhelming focus of the Court’s attention to specific personal juris-
diction concerned the degree to which a legal actor had, by purpose-
fully availing itself of the forum state, submitted itself to that state’s 
courts. An array of recent decisions by the Court—Goodyear,154 Daim-
ler,155 and most importantly Bristol-Myers Squibb156—has revealed 
that specific jurisdiction is not only about whether a defendant has so 
many contacts with a state that it cannot complain that it is being un-
fairly burdened by having to litigate there. It is about whether this 
state, among all jurisdictions, has any business adjudicating the par-
ticular claims against the defendant that the plaintiff has brought.157 
This question—sometimes referred to as the principle of “interstate 
 
 153. See Effron, supra note 5, at 872 (describing the two dimensions of the relat-
edness problem in terms of the relationship between the defendant and the forum, and 
the relationship between the lawsuit and the forum). 
 154. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 155. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 156. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 157. Our analysis addresses the jurisdictional reach of state courts as a constitu-
tional matter; it does not address the jurisdictional reach of federal courts as a consti-
tutional matter. Because of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k), limits on state-court 
jurisdictional reach currently translate into restrictions on federal-court jurisdictional 
reach in most cases. Nothing in our analysis, however, undermines the perfectly rea-
sonable idea that, with appropriate statutory authorization, federal courts could offer 
broader jurisdictional reach to facilitate nationwide aggregation and other goals. See 
generally Dodson, supra note 5; A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction 
for our Federal Courts, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 325 (2010). 
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federalism”158—does indeed implicate defendant’s due process rights, 
but it simultaneously concerns respect for the sovereignty of other 
states and other jurisdictions.159 As Justice Alito analyzed it in Bristol-
Myers Squibb, states exceed their jurisdictional authority if they are 
too willing to exercise their own power in cases that are not their busi-
ness—where they do not have a “legitimate interest.”160 
We shall refer to the “no-legitimate-interest” concern highlighted 
in Bristol-Myers Squibb as “the busybody problem.” The point is that a 
state’s courts ought not meddle in affairs beyond the state’s legitimate 
domain of interest; if a court does so (without a defendant’s consent), 
and thereby exceeds the domain of the state’s sovereign power in at-
tempting to make a binding determination of the defendant’s rights 
and obligations, it violates a defendant’s due process rights. In Bristol-
Myers Squibb, to the extent the California court exercised jurisdiction 
over the out-of-state defendant for the claims of Californians allegedly 
harmed by the defendant’s drug in California, there was no busybody 
problem. There was a busybody problem, however, to the extent the 
California court purported to exercise jurisdiction over the out-of-
state defendant for the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs arising outside 
of California. In holding that California lacked specific jurisdiction over 
BMS for the claims of the non-California plaintiffs,161 the Supreme 
Court was giving effect to the anti-busybody principle. 
Once the anti-busybody principle is identified, it is easy to spot it 
at work in other cases. In Daimler, a group of Argentinian plaintiffs 
brought suit in the Northern District of California against Daimler, a 
German company, regarding injuries in Argentina allegedly caused by 
Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary.162 The Supreme Court held that Cal-
ifornia’s courts163 lacked personal jurisdiction.164 The Court focused 
on the question of general jurisdiction because it was clear that 
 
 158. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).  
 159. See Brilmayer, supra note 11, at 13–14. 
 160. 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (“Assessing this burden obviously requires a court to con-
sider the practical problems resulting from litigating in the forum, but it also encom-
passes the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that 
may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question.”). 
 161. Id. at 1783–84. 
 162. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120–21 (2014). 
 163. Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) generally frames the territorial 
reach of service of process for federal courts in terms of whether a state court would 
have jurisdiction, the Supreme Court analyzed the personal jurisdiction of the district 
court in terms of California’s jurisdiction. See id. at 125. 
 164. Id. at 121–22. 
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specific jurisdiction was absent in Daimler.165 The anti-busybody prin-
ciple explains exactly why the lack of case-linked jurisdiction was so 
clear. If a California court were to purport to adjudicate claims that 
arose entirely in Argentina against a German company, it would be 
meddling in affairs over which its state lacks sufficient interest.  
Similarly, in Goodyear, the Supreme Court held that North Caro-
lina lacked personal jurisdiction over French, Turkish, and Luxem-
bourgian defendants for wrongful death claims involving a bus rollo-
ver accident in France.166 As in Daimler, the Court focused on the 
question of general jurisdiction because specific jurisdiction was 
clearly absent.167 And again, the lack of specific jurisdiction is explica-
ble in terms of the busybody problem. If a North Carolina court were 
to purport to adjudicate claims against foreign manufacturers for 
claims arising out of an accident in France—only because the victims 
were from North Carolina—the court would be meddling in affairs be-
yond the domain of the state’s sovereign power. The Supreme Court’s 
message to state courts in Goodyear, Daimler, and Bristol-Myers Squibb 
is clear: don’t be a busybody. 
C. SCOPE OF SUBMISSION 
Even if a case presents no busybody problem, however—that is, 
even if the forum state has an interest in the matter that places the 
dispute between plaintiff and defendant within the domain of the 
state’s power—the court may nonetheless lack personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant. This failure of jurisdiction comes in two forms: 
one straightforward, the other subtle.  
The straightforward version of the problem is handled through 
the minimum contacts element. These are cases in which the dispute 
centers on an occurrence within the forum state, but a particular de-
fendant has no purposeful contacts with the state. This was the situa-
tion in World-Wide Volkswagen, where the Court held that Oklahoma 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the New York dealer and distributor 
because these defendants lacked minimum contacts with Okla-
homa.168 
 
 165. See id. at 133 (“Plaintiffs have never attempted to fit this case into the specific 
jurisdiction category.”) (emphasis in original). 
 166. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011). 
 167. See id. at 919 (“Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in 
France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold 
abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the contro-
versy.”). 
 168. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–96 (1979).  
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Yet even if a case presents neither a minimum contacts problem 
(that is, the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state in 
some way) nor a busybody problem (that is, the forum state has suffi-
cient legitimate interest in the matter), the court may nonetheless lack 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant’s contacts do 
not constitute submission to the state’s authority with regard to the 
dispute in a particular case. For case-linked personal jurisdiction, the 
respects in which the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the 
state must not be unrelated to the claims brought by the plaintiff, be-
cause if they are, the defendant’s contacts do not count as submission 
for that kind of suit. Thus, in World-Wide Volkswagen, if the New York 
dealer had had purposeful contacts with Oklahoma that were com-
pletely unrelated to the Robinson’s claim, the court would still have 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the dealer. In this hypothetical sce-
nario, the minimum contacts element would have been satisfied, and 
the anti-busybody principle would have been satisfied, but the case 
would not have fallen within the scope of the defendant’s submission 
to the state’s power. 
While the question of scope of submission does not admit of 
treatment under a bright-line rule, it identifies an issue of salient con-
stitutional significance and frames a judicially manageable inquiry 
about it. By focusing on whether the subject matter of the suit falls 
within the type of adjudication that is implicated by the defendant’s 
purposeful contacts with the forum state, this prong trains judicial at-
tention on the heart of the due process inquiry. If the defendant is be-
ing sued for a matter that relates to its purposeful availment of the 
forum state, then the defendant has fair notice of the type of suit that 
it might have to defend there.169  
 
 169. Although, as we discuss below, some (including Ford in the litigation now be-
fore the Court) have aimed to characterize this inquiry by reference to the negligence-
law concept of proximate cause, a more apt tort analogy for the scope-of-submission 
inquiry comes from the law of defamation. In determining who counts as a public fig-
ure so as to benefit from the “actual malice” rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court has contrasted “general purpose” public figures—
roughly, household names—with “limited purpose” public figures—persons who are 
in the public eye because of their involvement in a controversy that has received public 
attention. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Ordinarily, for persons to 
be deemed limited purpose public figures, they must “thrust themselves to the fore-
front of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the is-
sues involved.” Id. at 345. The core idea is that one who chooses to become involved in 
a matter receiving or likely to receive public attention submits to certain kinds of scru-
tiny and criticism, but only if related to that matter. In fleshing out what it means for 
the scrutiny and criticism to be properly “related to” the controversy, courts have rec-
ognized that a broad range of facts about a person are relevant. They have therefore 
treated statements about a plaintiff as related to the controversy in question when 
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D. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
Our central claim is that the case-linkage element incudes both 
the anti-busybody principle and the scope-of-submission principle. 
More broadly, case-linked jurisdiction demands minimum contacts 
plus a relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion—a case link—that satisfies both of these requirements. The anti-
busybody principle and the scope-of-submission principle are both 
rooted in due process, and both concern whether a defendant can rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court by the state on a matter of 
this kind. As to the busybody problem, defendants cannot be expected 
to anticipate that a state will exercise power on a matter in which it 
has no legitimate interest, and even if they could anticipate it, they 
should not be subject to it. As to the scope of submission, a defendant’s 
purposeful availment of the state in some respect cannot be construed 
as an all-purpose submission to a state’s power: there is a certain 
scope of matters one could be deemed to have submitted to, and a de-
fendant can only be expected to anticipate being haled into court in a 
state for matters within that scope. When courts describe the case-
linkage requirement in terms of whether the claim “arises out of or 
relates to” the defendant’s contacts, they capture only part of the pic-
ture, and they capture it misleadingly, because the “arising out of or 
related to” framing confusingly blurs the scope-of-submission princi-
ple and the anti-busybody principle. 
Under the scope-of-submission principle, the kind of claims a 
plaintiff asserts must be related to the defendants’ purposeful con-
tacts with the forum state. That is because, absent consent, the defend-
ant’s “purposeful availment” of the state constitutes the basis of the 
defendant’s submission to state power for purposes of the due process 
analysis. For specific jurisdiction over a defendant, one question is 
whether the kinds of claims involved in the litigation are properly con-
strued as being within the scope of that submission. Thus, the 
 
they concern “talents, education, experience and motives [that] could have been rele-
vant to the public’s decision whether to listen to [her],” Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publica-
tions, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980), quite 
apart from whether these pertain directly to the facts of the specific controversy. See 
generally 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS, 
§ 5.3.3 (5th ed. 2017) (explaining the relatedness requirement for limited purpose 
public figure doctrine). In sum, the principle that a limited purpose public figure’s in-
vitation of public attention fairly subjects her to a higher degree of public scrutiny gen-
erates an inquiry about the connection between the scope of added public scrutiny and 
the character of the public attention invited. Similarly, the principle that the defend-
ant’s purposeful availment of the state demonstrates a higher degree of submission to 
the adjudicative authority of a state’s courts generates an inquiry about the connection 
between the scope of that authority and the character of the purposeful availment.  
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relatedness idea in the phrase “arising out of or related to” captures 
the thrust of the requirement that specific jurisdiction fall within the 
scope of a defendant’s submission to the forum state’s authority by 
virtue of the defendant’s purposeful connection with the state. 
But relatedness is not the whole picture. The case-linkage element 
requires more than merely that the plaintiff’s claims be related to the 
defendant’s contacts. Otherwise, the California court in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb would have had jurisdiction over the defendant for the claims 
of the non-Californians, which surely were related to the defendant’s 
nationwide marketing and sale of Plavix, including in California, as 
Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent.170 In addition to a show-
ing of relatedness to satisfy the scope-of-submission principle, the 
case-linkage element requires satisfaction of the anti-busybody prin-
ciple. It is the latter principle that explains why the California court 
lacked jurisdiction over BMS for the claims of the non-Californians. 
Case-linked jurisdiction requires that the forum state’s interest in the 
dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant suffice to permit the 
forum state to exercise sovereignty. As to that question, relatedness to 
the contacts constituting the defendant’s purposeful availments is not 
always sufficient. The defendant’s involvement in the events generat-
ing the litigation must be such as to create the basis for the forum state 
to use its courts to hold the defendant accountable to the plaintiff in 
some manner, assuming the “submission” factor is present. 
In the Ford cases pending before the Court, it is to Ford’s credit 
that it attempts to justify its proposed rule by reference to an argu-
ment about why neither Montana nor Minnesota has an adequate ba-
sis for asserting its authority as a sovereign in the respective cases.171 
Yet that argument displays basic misconceptions about products lia-
bility, federalism, and state sovereignty. Ford argues, in essence, that 
because the car that killed Gullett was initially sold in the state of 
Washington and not in Montana, the regulatory basis of jurisdictional 
power is in Washington, rather than in Montana.172 It offers a similar 
argument with regard to Bandemer: the car involved in that crash was 
initially sold in North Dakota, not in Minnesota, so the regulatory in-
terest that would warrant a state’s assertion of sovereignty over 
Bandemer’s claim against Ford belongs to North Dakota, not 
 
 170. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Ca., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1786 (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting). 
 171. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 12, at 26–27. 
 172. Id. at 45–48. 
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Minnesota.173 Of course Ford’s arguments are not phrased in the 
terms of our approach, but it is not difficult to see how it would apply.  
Ford’s invocation of Bristol-Myers Squibb against Montana and 
Minnesota is tantamount to an assertion that those states are being 
busybodies, just as California would have been if the Court had not re-
versed the California Supreme Court’s decision regarding the non-Cal-
ifornia plaintiffs. Whether a state is being a busybody turns on which 
of its interests, if any, are at stake. Putting to one side, for the moment, 
the issues of purposeful availment and scope of submission that fig-
ured prominently in cases such as World-Wide Volkswagen (we turn 
to these below), the thought that Montana and Minnesota have no in-
terest in providing redress to victims of torts that occur within their 
respective borders is preposterous. Indeed, the only way in which it 
can be rendered even superficially plausible is if one supposes that a 
state’s interest in applying its tort law is exhausted by the ex ante, de-
terrent effect of such law. Of course, tort law sometimes does have a 
deterrent impact, and much late-twentieth-century tort scholarship 
(including that of the law and economics school) has added greatly to 
our understanding of this idea.174 But it would be absurd for the Su-
preme Court, in analyzing a due process problem, to treat a state’s in-
terest in providing tort law as limited to its interest in deterrence. The 
common law of torts in every state, no less than the common law of 
contract, has always been understood equally as a law of redress or 
accountability. To quote again the Court’s own language from Burger 
King: “A State generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its resi-
dents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-
of-state actors.”175 Indeed, even in punitive damages law—the aspect 
of tort law that comes closest to being purely regulatory—the Court 
has decided there is and constitutionally must be a fundamentally in-
dividual-plaintiff, non-regulatory orientation, and that the individual 
accountability features of tort law are central to due process analy-
sis.176 
The foregoing is not a mere theoretical point. If, as Ford itself has 
maintained, the proper analysis of case-linked jurisdiction is a matter 
 
 173. Id.  
 174. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L. J. 513, 544–60 
(2003). 
 175. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985). 
 176. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (holding that the amount 
of punitive damages awarded to a tort plaintiff must be set by reference to the mis-
treatment by the defendant of the plaintiff, not by the losses the defendant’s conduct 
may have inflicted on others). 
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of “interstate federalism,” it is crucial that we understand what gives 
each state the power to subject defendants to adjudication of civil 
cases, including tort cases, in its courts.177 Tort law, unlike regulatory 
law, draws an essential connection between the defendant’s unlawful 
conduct and the victim’s power to obtain compensation: it is equally a 
law of conduct-guidance and liability. So, when it comes to capturing 
Minnesota’s or Montana’s authority to administer and apply this basic 
and longstanding body of law, the question is not properly framed, 
narrowly, in terms of each state’s interest in ensuring the manufacture 
and sale of suitably safe new cars in its territory. That is the pure ex 
ante regulation view. Each state has the authority—and indeed the re-
sponsibility—not only to set rules and standards for how individuals 
and firms must avoid causing injuries to others, but also to enable per-
sons within its territory who are injured by violations of those rules 
and standards to hold the injurer accountable through its courts. Tort 
law—as a system for redressing wrongs and obtaining compensation 
for injury—has substantial status within each state’s constitutional 
law, and our federal Due Process Clause has been understood by the 
Supreme Court to incorporate that status.178 
Thus, while tortious conduct by an actor within a state can be one 
basis for a state’s legitimate interest in providing a forum for redress, 
it is not the only basis. Another basis for the state’s interest is tortious 
injury within a state.179 If the tortfeasor (or its agents) happen not to 
 
 177. Although the Supreme Court made it clear in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982), that the personal jurisdiction 
requirement protects an individual liberty interest, and explicitly downplayed the no-
tion of sovereignty, concerns about sovereignty and interstate federalism have never 
disappeared from personal jurisdiction analysis and are built into the due process 
analysis, as the Court revealed emphatically in Bristol-Myers Squibb. v. Superior Court, 
137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
 178. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 30–43 
(2020).  
 179. It is worth noting that the common law of torts does not embrace a sharp dis-
tinction between tortious acts and tortious injuries. Nor should it. As two of us (among 
others) have shown, the wrongs of tort law are “injury-inclusive”: a tort is not commit-
ted until potentially injurious conduct is actualized in injury. See id. at 28, 92–98, 183–
88. This idea is no mere philosopher’s indulgence. It is and always has been core to the 
domains of overlap between civil procedure and torts, as topics from statutes of limi-
tation to choice-of-law to venue and personal jurisdiction reflect. Moreover, the Court’s 
own tort decisions from defamation to products liability to punitive damages have re-
flected the same theme. Indeed, the particular account of the “injury-inclusiveness” of 
tortious wrongdoing developed by Goldberg and Zipursky grew in part out of a defense 
and explanation of the Court’s opinion in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buck-
ley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997), which rejected the idea that plaintiffs who had not yet suffered 
injury from asbestos exposure presented a mere “damages” problem. Id. at 444. 
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be physically present in the state when the plaintiff is tortiously in-
jured, that itself does not undercut the legitimacy of the state’s interest 
in adjudicating a claim against that tortfeasor. The Court’s decision in 
McGee makes the analogous point as to contract claims: “It cannot be 
denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective 
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay 
claims.”180 In terms of the elements of specific personal jurisdiction, 
the minimum contacts element trains attention specifically on the ac-
tor’s purposeful conduct vis-à-vis the forum state, but if the element 
of purposeful contact is met, then the anti-busybody aspect of the 
case-linkage element may be satisfied by interests that go beyond the 
state’s interest in ex ante regulation of in-state conduct. The Court has 
repeatedly pronounced that the identification of torts and the provi-
sion of court-ordered compensation for them is a basic function of 
state law.181 A state is not being a busybody when it fulfills its respon-
sibility to provide a forum for redress of tortious injuries occurring 
within the state.  
We can illustrate our point by comparing Goodyear, Daimler, and 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, on the one hand, with World-Wide Volkswagen, 
Nicastro, and the Ford cases on the other, and then comparing World-
Wide Volkswagen and Nicastro with the Ford cases. In Goodyear, Daim-
ler, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, the relevant incidents and injuries oc-
curred entirely outside of the forum state, whereas in each of World-
Wide Volkswagen, Nicastro, and the Ford cases, the relevant accident 
 
Instead, the Court rightly concluded that there was a liability problem, because the de-
fendant who negligently exposes someone to asbestos fibers has not by that fact alone 
committed the tort of negligence—there must also be a resulting injury, such as bodily 
harm. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1625, 1699–1701 (2002). In a products liability case, the product’s malfunction and 
causing of injury in the state matter to the personal jurisdiction analysis, even if those 
contacts might not themselves establish purposeful availment by the defendant: the 
sorts of contacts that satisfy the minimum contacts element (purposeful availment) 
are not the only contacts that matter for the case-linkage element of specific jurisdic-
tion. In any event, a proper understanding of sovereignty, territoriality, and tort law in 
our federalist system requires recognition that, in an important sense, a defendant 
commits a tort in the state where wrongful acts ripen into actual injury. Notwithstand-
ing these observations and their deep grounding in the common law and the Court’s 
own decisions, the analysis in the body of the essay assumes arguendo a more reduc-
tive approach according to which tortious acts and tortious injury are separated. 
 180. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
 181. See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A., 568 U.S. 627, 639–40 (2013) (“In our federal system, 
there is no question that States possess the ‘traditional authority to provide tort rem-
edies to their citizens’ as they see fit.”) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 462 U.S. 
238, 248 (1984)); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (empha-
sizing the longstanding availability of tort compensation through state court actions). 
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and injury occurred in the forum state. For this reason, the anti-busy-
body principle precluded specific jurisdiction in Goodyear, Daimler, 
and Bristol-Myers Squibb, but not in the others. There was nothing bus-
ybody-ish about Oklahoma, New Jersey, Montana, and Minnesota as-
serting an interest in adjudicating the claims arising from in-state ac-
cidents in World-Wide Volkswagen, Nicastro, and the Ford cases. But 
the case-linkage element, with its anti-busybody principle, is only one 
piece of the analysis; the minimum contacts element must be satisfied 
as well. Thus, in World-Wide Volkswagen and Nicastro, the Court found 
that a tortious injury in the state was not sufficient, because minimum 
contacts by the defendant were absent.182 On this point, of course, the 
Ford cases are very different: no one disputes that Ford sold large 
numbers of vehicles in each state. Thus, the Ford cases resemble Daim-
ler and Bristol-Myers Squibb in demonstrating minimum contacts, and 
they resemble World-Wide Volkswagen and Nicastro in not raising the 
busybody problem. 
One might ask: If the state has a legitimate interest in providing 
redress to persons tortiously injured in their state, why shouldn’t the 
analysis end there, permitting case-linked jurisdiction in cases like 
World-Wide Volkswagen and Nicastro? The answer is that the busy-
body analysis goes only to the legitimacy of the state’s interest in ad-
judicating the claims. It does not address the other aspects of the due 
process analysis, which concern whether a defendant has acted pur-
posefully toward a state in a way that counts as a submission to state 
authority (the minimum contacts element), and if so, whether the par-
ticular dispute falls within the scope of the defendant’s submission 
(the scope-of-submission aspect of the case-linkage element). The 
presence of in-principle power based on the state’s interest in provid-
ing a forum for redress of injuries does not answer whether the de-
fendant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the state. Yet if the defend-
ant has purposefully availed itself of the state, if the defendant has 
done so in ways that are directly related rather than tangential to the 
state’s assertion of power in the case at hand, and if the state has a 
legitimate interest in adjudicating the dispute, then all of the require-
ments of case-linked jurisdiction are satisfied. By selling its vehicles in 
Montana and Minnesota, Ford submitted to the authority of the courts 
of those states to hear claims against it arising out of the use of those 
cars. This is why there is no scope-of-submission problem in the Ford 
cases. Given Ford’s extensive contacts with those states, and the ab-
sence of any busybody problem, Ford was, in these cases, properly 
 
 182. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886–87 (2011); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980). 
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subject to the jurisdiction of the Montana and Minnesota courts, re-
spectively. 
Our approach is conservative and grounded in the case law. In-
deed, more than fifty years ago, Professors von Mehren and Trautman 
described a very similar approach as “conservative” in their famous 
and oft-cited Harvard Law Review article.183 Applying our analysis to 
the Ford cases and comparing those cases to the Supreme Court’s 
prior decisions, one can see that each of the requirements of case-
linked jurisdiction is satisfied. First, the minimum contacts element is 
obviously met. As both the Montana and the Minnesota courts found, 
Ford purposefully availed itself of their states by their extensive in-
state marketing, sales, and service.184 In terms of the extent and pur-
posefulness of the defendant’s contacts, the Ford cases resemble the 
cases in which the Court has upheld specific jurisdiction—Interna-
tional Shoe, McGee, Calder, Keeton, and Burger King—and indeed 
would fall at the easy end of the spectrum. On the issue of minimum 
contacts, these cases are miles away from World-Wide Volkswagen and 
Nicastro. 
Second, the scope-of-submission aspect of the case-linkage ele-
ment is satisfied. Ford’s contacts with Montana included substantial 
sales of Ford Explorers; its contacts with Minnesota included substan-
tial sales of Ford Crown Victorias.185 These activities are not tangential 
to the in-state injuries to the plaintiffs from an allegedly defective Ex-
plorer in Montana and an allegedly defective Crown Victoria in 
 
 183. See Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 27, at 1152–53 (emphasis added): 
A conservative statement of contemporary American thinking on this subject 
is section 1.03 of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, ap-
proved in 1962 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  
Section 1.03. [Personal Jurisdiction Based upon Conduct.] 
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts di-
rectly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from 
the person’s . . .  
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; 
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state 
if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent 
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed 
or services rendered, in this state. . . . 
The final section of the article actually considers and approves of personal jurisdiction 
in the particular category of section 1.03(4). See id. at 1176. 
 184. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 443 P.3d 407, 414 (Mont. 
2019), cert. granted, No. 19-368, 140 S. Ct. 917 (Jan. 17, 2020); Bandemer v. Ford Motor 
Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-369, 140 S. Ct. 916 (Jan. 17, 
2020). 
 185. Brief of Respondents, supra note 149, at 5–7.  
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Minnesota, even if the cars involved in the accidents happen to have 
been sold elsewhere, originally. When we ask whether the prospect of 
defending tort suits in the Minnesota and Montana courts for alleged 
defects in an Explorer or Crown Victoria is something Ford could have 
reasonably anticipated, the answer is a painfully obvious “yes.” When 
we ask whether Ford, by selling these types of vehicles in these states, 
may reasonably be deemed to have submitted to these states’ author-
ity to adjudicate products liability claims concerning these vehicles, 
the answer is also “yes.” Such adjudications are within the scope of 
those matters with respect to which Ford has implicitly submitted to 
the state’s authority by purposefully availing itself of those states as a 
mass manufacturer and seller of automobiles. In this respect, too, the 
Ford cases resemble the cases in which the Court has upheld specific 
jurisdiction—International Shoe, McGee, Calder, Keeton, and Burger 
King—because each case involved a dispute related to the defendant’s 
purposeful contact with the forum state.  
Third, the anti-busybody principle is satisfied. Markkaya Gullett, 
a Montana resident, died in a rollover of a Ford Explorer that occurred 
on a Montana highway.186 Adam Bandemer, a Minnesota resident, suf-
fered injuries in a Minnesota crash of a Ford Crown Victoria when the 
airbag failed to deploy.187 There is no sense in which Montana or Min-
nesota could be seen as busybody states by making their courts avail-
able as forums to adjudicate their claims. They have plenty of reason 
to have their courts adjudicate these claims for redress arising out of 
tortious injuries that occurred in state. In this regard, the Ford cases 
again resemble each case in which the Court upheld specific jurisdic-
tion, including International Shoe, McGee, Calder, Keeton, and Burger 
King.  
Indeed, the Ford cases once again fall at the easy end of the spec-
trum. In Calder and Keeton, Florida and Ohio arguably would have 
been more interested forums than California and New Hampshire, 
whereas in the Ford cases, particularly when one considers joinder of 
additional parties, it is hard to imagine more appropriate forums than 
Montana and Minnesota. Turning to the cases in which the Court ex-
plicitly or implicitly rejected specific jurisdiction, the busybody prob-
lem distinguishes the Ford cases from Helicopteros, Goodyear, Daimler, 
and most importantly, Bristol-Myers Squibb. Texas lacked sufficient in-
terest in the Peru helicopter crash in Helicopteros; North Carolina 
lacked sufficient interest in the France bus rollover accident in 
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Goodyear; California lacked sufficient interest in the Argentina human 
rights abuses in Daimler; and in Bristol-Myers Squibb, California lacked 
sufficient interest in the claims of non-Californians who purchased, 
used, and claimed to have been injured by the defendant’s drug in 
states other than California.188 In each of these cases, the states could 
be accused of being busybodies—meddling in affairs in which they 
lacked sufficient legitimate interest—and thus violating a defendant’s 
due process rights by exceeding the domain of the state’s sovereign 
power. By contrast, no one could accuse Montana or Minnesota of be-
ing busybodies with respect to disputes concerning the Gullett and 
Bandemer accidents. 
One irony of Ford’s analysis is that the out-of-state acts on which 
it focuses—sales in North Dakota and Washington—have become 
largely irrelevant in the substance of American tort law in many juris-
dictions. Put aside that the Ford dealers in North Dakota and Wash-
ington state were actually not Ford agents, but independent contrac-
tors. Ford seems to imagine that there would be a products liability 
action in the state of sale. In theory, strict products liability claims may 
exist against all commercial sellers of a product, including manufac-
turers, distributors, and retailers.189 Yet in recent years, many state 
legislatures have passed statutes shielding retailers from strict liabil-
ity claims. Both North Dakota and Washington have such statutes.190 
One is reminded of Judge Cardozo’s famous quip in MacPherson that 
“[t]he dealer was indeed the one person of whom it might be said with 
some approach to certainty that by him the car would not be used.”191 
Likewise, here, the state of the (new car) dealer was a state of which 
it might be said with certainty that it has no legitimate interest in ad-
judicating the case (or, at least, a far weaker interest than Minnesota 
and Montana). 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court held that although 
California had personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer for claims 
by Californians who bought, used, and allegedly suffered injury from 
Plavix in California, the state did not have personal jurisdiction over 
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the manufacturer for claims by non-Californians who bought, used, 
and allegedly suffered injury from Plavix in other states.192 Now sup-
pose there had been a Californian plaintiff who took the drug in Cali-
fornia and claims to have been harmed by it in California, but who pur-
chased the drug out of state (say, at a pharmacy in Nevada). For 
purposes of determining whether the plaintiff may sue BMS in Califor-
nia, should this hypothetical plaintiff’s claims be placed in the same 
bucket with the non-Californians over whose claims California lacked 
power, or rather in the same bucket as the Californians who were per-
mitted to sue at home? Our approach offers a principled basis to reach 
the intuitively correct answer that the manufacturer’s due process 
rights would not be offended by California’s adjudication of the claims 
of all Californians who claim to have been injured by the drug in Cali-
fornia, including our hypothetical plaintiff who happened to have pur-
chased the drug in another state. 
IV.  COMPARING OUR FRAMEWORK TO ALTERNATIVES   
As mentioned above, courts have taken different approaches to 
what we call the case-linkage element of specific personal jurisdiction. 
In particular, they have placed various glosses on the “arising out of or 
related to” language so often used to describe the linkage require-
ment. In this Part, we briefly explain why these alternatives are less 
satisfactory than our approach.  
We can begin by considering the non-specific conception of “re-
latedness” favored by the plaintiffs in the Ford litigation. The plaintiffs 
(aptly) distinguish their cases from Bristol-Myers Squibb by pointing 
out that each of the victims was a resident of the forum state and was 
injured by the defendant’s product in the forum state.193 Without 
much by way of further specification, they argue that this is enough to 
provide the “relatedness” necessary for specific jurisdiction.194 The 
principal shortcoming of this approach is that it is too capacious to 
provide meaningful guidance. Our framework provides guidance for 
thinking about relatedness by giving a functional account of the values 
embedded in the linkage element of case-linked jurisdiction. 
Several courts have alternatively ruled that the “arising out of or 
related to” requirement is satisfied when the defendant’s purposeful 
availment of the forum state functions as a but-for cause of the 
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incident giving rise to the litigation.195 It is important to see both why 
the but-for causation requirement is misguided and why it has never-
theless seemed tempting to some courts. We start with a hypothetical: 
  Ms. Napoli, a Floridian, was a job candidate for a position at Kings Law 
School in Manhattan. Although she strongly preferred not to live in New York 
City, she applied for the job because it provided the unusual benefit of a five-
year, pre-tenure Osla Fellowship for scholars doing research in her areas of 
interest. The Osla Fellowship is funded by Osla Corporation (Osla), which 
produces electric cars, among other things. Osla’s state of incorporation is 
Delaware and its principal place of business is Texas. 
  Napoli flew from Miami to New York to interview for the position. By 
prior arrangement, Professor Bloom of the Kings Law School met Napoli at 
Newark International Airport in New Jersey to give her a ride to the school. 
Bloom’s car, as it turns out, was a brand new O-Mobile, a product that Osla 
exclusively designs, manufactures and sells in Texas, and which Bloom pur-
chased in Texas. While on the New Jersey Turnpike, Bloom’s car was struck 
by another car. Because the O-Mobile’s passenger-side airbag malfunctioned, 
Napoli was seriously injured.  
  Napoli, who turned down the job and remains a Florida domiciliary, 
brought a products liability lawsuit against Osla in New York state court. 
On the but-for approach to case-linkage, New York courts would have 
personal jurisdiction over Osla in Napoli’s suit against it. Osla’s contact 
with Kings Law School was a purposeful availment of the forum state, 
and it was a but-for cause of Napoli’s injury.  
Our point is not merely that the but-for theory gets an intuitively 
unacceptable result in this hypothetical, although it surely does. More 
fundamentally, but-for causation fails to capture the idea of case-
linked jurisdiction. If its courts were to entertain Napoli’s suit against 
Osla, the State of New York would be asserting power over Osla with 
respect to a matter in which it has no business, notwithstanding that 
the defendant’s New York contact was a but-for cause of the events 
giving rise to the litigation.196 
Our framework takes specific jurisdiction head-on and explains 
why, in the imagined case of Napoli v. Osla, the New York courts cannot 
assert personal jurisdiction over Osla. To say that New York has no 
business hearing the case is, of course, to flag the busybody problem. 
New York has no particular interest that would support its courts 
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haling Osla before them. The accident in question did not happen in 
New York. No transaction of relevance to the dispute between Napoli 
and Osla occurred in New York. Napoli is not a New York resident. In 
contrast to Texas, Florida and perhaps New Jersey, New York has no 
reason to entertain this suit. Were it to do so, it would be doing so only 
as a busybody.  
But-for causation is not only overinclusive, it is also underinclu-
sive. Consider the Chinese drywall litigation,197 highlighted in the ami-
cus brief submitted in the Ford cases by a group of homebuilders.198 
Thousands of homeowners are suing Taishan Gypsum Company 
(Taishan), a Chinese company that supplied defective drywall used to 
build homes in Florida, Louisiana, and other states.199 For simplicity, 
we address the Florida plaintiffs. The company knew it was supplying 
drywall to be used in many states including Florida, and it had many 
actual contacts in Florida, including some purposeful availments (it 
sold some drywall sheets directly to Florida distributors of building 
materials, and shipped thousands of sheets explicitly to be delivered 
in Pensacola, Florida).200 Nonetheless, the company argued that even 
where a Florida plaintiff’s home had been built with defective Taishan 
drywall sheets, specific personal jurisdiction would be lacking if those 
particular sheets came to the builders who built the home with mate-
rials supplied by a distributor in a state other than Florida, because in 
those cases the but-for causation standard is not met.201 The absurd 
result—according to which a foreign corporation might avoid state-
court jurisdiction for torts committed against state residents—
demonstrates the inaptness of the but-for test. There are purposeful 
contacts by the defendant with the forum state; these contacts are re-
lated to the matter at hand; and courts in Florida would not be med-
dlers or busybodies in adjudicating these cases. 
Finally, we compare our approach to the proximate-causation 
rendition of case-linkage that has been expressly adopted by some 
courts. The underinclusiveness of but-for causation—as illustrated in 
the Chinese drywall cases and explained above—already entails that 
a proximate cause standard must also fail. Nonetheless, it is 
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impossible to resist offering a few more words about why it is espe-
cially misguided to suppose that “proximate cause” should be the 
lodestar of specific personal jurisdiction law. 
Is it really plausible, as Ford suggests, that combining proximate 
cause concepts with specific jurisdiction concepts promises clarity? 
Even back in 1934, the American Law Institute was so exasperated 
with “proximate cause” that it excluded the term from the blackletter 
of the First Torts Restatement. It hoped instead that the term “legal 
cause” would do better.202 Thirty years later, nothing had changed: the 
Restatement (Second) followed suit.203 A decade ago, the Restatement 
(Third) Reporters correctly concluded that the effort to salvage “prox-
imate cause” by renaming it “legal cause” had failed.204 In response, 
however, they did not return to the traditional usage of proximate 
cause, but instead tried out a different neologism: “scope of liabil-
ity.”205 Thus far, there is little reason to think this formulation will fare 
any better than its predecessors, even as courts cast proximate cause 
in terms of “foreseeability.”206 
Beyond the likelihood that a proximate cause standard would ob-
scure more than it clarifies, there is another irony in Ford’s reliance 
on that concept. It has long been hornbook law that a fact pattern’s 
atypical “manner of harm”—a detour in the causal pathway between 
a defendant’s predicate act and a plaintiff’s injury—does not defeat 
the proximate cause requirement, so long as the plaintiff’s injury was 
foreseeable and was the kind of event as to which the defendant was 
required to be vigilant.207 Design defect law is about Ford’s duty to 
send out into the world vehicles that are sufficiently sound and safe 
for ordinary use by the consumers it cultivates in its advertising and 
marketing. The fact that there was an out-of-state sale between Ford’s 
making of the car and its arrival and injuring of a plaintiff in Montana 
or Minnesota in no way undermines proximate cause, so long as Ford 
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was aiming for the relevant models of cars to be bought, sold, and used 
in Montana or Minnesota, which it clearly was. 
There is a deeper point about why “proximate cause” does not 
have a role in the proper analysis of the case-linkage element. Inter-
pretations of “proximate cause” can be roughly divided into “gestalt” 
and “conceptualistic” approaches. The gestalt approach, typified by 
Judge Andrews’ famous Palsgraf dissent, takes the view that a line on 
liability must be drawn somewhere for a variety of pragmatic reasons, 
and interprets “proximate cause” as a façade for judges’ or jurors’ ex-
ercise of this gestalt pragmatic judgment.208 No such approach can aid 
the causes of clarity or certainty. Conceptualistic versions of proxi-
mate cause—foreseeability, scope of risk, and the like—deem proxi-
mate cause to have an analytic structure that aims to capture when a 
relationship between what made the defendant’s conduct wrongful, 
on the one hand, and the injury that actually occurred, on the other, is 
of the right sort to sustain liability.209 These conceptualistic accounts 
also will not help clarify specific personal jurisdiction because the 
minimum contacts that provide the starting point for jurisdiction are 
not typically wrongful in any way. Indeed, a great deal of personal ju-
risdiction law—from International Shoe to Burger King and beyond—
has nothing to do with torts or wrongful contacts at all. In sum, con-
ceptualistic versions of proximate cause can get no foothold in this 
area of the law, while gestalt approaches promise only obscurity.  
Invocations of “proximate cause” in the context of jurisdiction are 
an indirect or analogical way of identifying considerations that can 
and should be addressed directly. Notions of proximate cause appear 
superficially relevant to discussions of personal jurisdiction because 
they refer generally to the idea that there must be the right sort of 
connection between two things in order for a legal consequence to fol-
low. In the law of negligence, for example, the proximate cause re-
quirement insists that the defendant’s careless conduct connect to the 
plaintiff’s injury in a non-haphazard way before liability will attach. 
With respect to specific personal jurisdiction, the relevant connection, 
as noted, is not between a wrongful act and an injury, but between the 
defendant’s forum contacts and the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s 
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claim. For this purpose, the right kind of connection exists so long as 
the suit concerns a matter within the scope of the defendant’s submis-
sion to the state’s power and so long as the state is not exceeding its 
legitimate authority. To refer to this standard as a “proximate cause” 
test adds nothing by way of clarity. Quite the opposite, it only gener-
ates confusion and counterintuitive results, including the result under 
which Ford avoids being subject to products liability claims in a state 
where it regularly sells the product in question and where the product 
allegedly malfunctioned causing injury to a state resident, merely be-
cause the particular item at issue happened to have first been sold in 
a different state.  
  CONCLUSION   
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has told courts to get 
serious about personal jurisdiction, and it has drawn a sharp distinc-
tion between all-purpose (or general) jurisdiction and case-linked (or 
specific) jurisdiction.210 But the Court has not explained clearly how to 
analyze the required case-linkage for the latter. This essay fills that 
gap. 
When wrestling with the question of what sort of linkage is re-
quired, the temptation to grab at some notion of causation is under-
standable. But causation does not capture how case-linkage matters 
for personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction, at the constitutional 
level, concerns the defendant’s due process right not to be subject to 
the adjudicatory power of a state unless: (a) the dispute falls within 
the scope of a defendant’s submission to state authority and (b) the 
exercise of power falls within the limits of the state’s legitimate au-
thority. These two aspects both bear on the court’s jurisdiction be-
cause the case-linkage element of specific jurisdiction concerns the 
limits of a sovereign’s adjudicatory authority over a particular defend-
ant and in a particular case. Although the combination of these ideas 
does indeed delimit specific jurisdiction based on case-linkage in the 
way suggested by the Court’s holdings, neither one is about causation. 
First, case-linkage requires a court to consider the scope of the 
defendant’s submission to state authority. Submission to state power 
not only explains the minimum contacts requirement, it also bears on 
the case-linkage element of specific jurisdiction. As a matter of general 
jurisdiction, defendants are considered to have submitted to a state’s 
all-purpose adjudicatory power if they have made the state their home 
(domicile for an individual, or home state such as state of 
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incorporation or headquarters for a corporation).211 For specific juris-
diction, the case must be appropriately linked to the defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum state. Thus, even if a defendant has had purpose-
ful contacts with the forum state, the state lacks specific jurisdiction 
over the defendant if the claims are unrelated to the defendant’s pur-
poseful contacts.  
But the scope-of-submission aspect of the case-linkage ele-
ment—important as it is—is not the whole story. In particular, it can-
not explain the result in Bristol-Myers Squibb. The point of Bristol-My-
ers Squibb is that even though the manufacturer had purposeful 
contacts with California including massive sales of Plavix in the state, 
and even though every nationwide Plavix product liability claim “re-
lated to” those contacts, the case-linkage element failed because Cali-
fornia courts were not permitted to meddle in affairs beyond the 
state’s legitimate reach. The Supreme Court saw the California court 
as a busybody. The California court presumed to adjudicate product 
liability claims against an out-of-state company by non-Californians 
whose claims arose entirely outside of California, and that, according 
to the Supreme Court, went too far.212 Case-linkage requires, in addi-
tion to satisfying the scope-of-submission principle, that the state not 
be a busybody. 
The Supreme Court, in the Ford cases, has been presented with a 
perfect opportunity to clarify the case-linkage element. It should see 
that the right result—both as a matter of the defendant’s due process 
rights and as a matter of permitting a sensible allocation of adjudica-
tory authority—is that Montana’s courts have power to adjudicate a 
wrongful death claim against Ford that arose out of a crash of a Ford 
vehicle in Montana, and Minnesota’s courts have power to adjudicate 
a personal injury claim against Ford that arose out of a crash of a Ford 
vehicle in Minnesota. It should reach that result, and simultaneously 
provide guidance to lower courts, by explaining what case-linked ju-
risdiction requires. As we have explained, case-linked jurisdiction re-
quires the establishment of two elements—minimum contacts and 
case-linkage—and the case-linkage element itself requires satisfac-
tion of two constraints—the scope-of-submission principle and the 
anti-busybody principle.  
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